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E D I T O R S ’ O B S E R V A T I O N S
Justice Reinvestment and the State of State
Sentencing Reform
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR
Professor, Marquette Law School
Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter
Fourteen years ago, I edited an FSR issue that surveyed recent developments in state sentencing reform.
That year, 2002, seemed to be a transitional time. In the 1990s, nearly all new laws pointed in one
direction—greater toughness. However, in the wake of the 2001 recession, several cash-strapped states
adopted reforms that were intended to curtail imprisonment growth and rein in corrections budgets.
A few optimistic commentators were welcoming a new era, seeing in the reforms a fresh and promising
political dynamic: fiscal conservatives were joining with liberals to produce thoughtful, constructive
reform—a striking departure from the aggressive partisanship and tough-on-crime posturing that
dominated sentencing policy in the 1990s. Providing an overview of these trends, my Editor’s Obser-
vations in 2002 were entitled ‘‘The New Politics of Sentencing.’’1
With the hindsight of fourteen years, the proclamation of a new era seems to have been both partly
prescient and partly premature. In one sense, the trends starting to become apparent in a few states
between 2000 and 2002 did expand across the country and still seem very much in evidence today.
Many conservatives have embraced the cause of decarceration and have worked across the aisle to enact
reforms diverting nonviolent offenders from prison and creating opportunities for those already in
prison to earn an accelerated release. As with the first wave of reforms adopted around the time of the
2001 recession, more recent changes have typically also been justified by reference to state fiscal
pressures—pressures that intensified sharply following the 2007 recession. Yet, for all of the reform
activity, remarkably little decarceration has actually occurred. On December 31, 2000, America’s prison
population stood at about 1.4 million; fourteen years later, the population numbered close to 1.6 mil-
lion—a net increase.2 Modest reductions did begin after 2009, when the national prison population hit
its peak, but most of this drop came from a single state, California, which was forced to decarcerate by
court order.3
The disappointing performance of the post-2000 reforms reflected certain limitations that may have
been inherent to the new sentencing politics. In my 2002 Editor’s Observations, I pointed to several
potential challenges for the emerging movement, including that short-term fiscal pressures might not
prove a sound foundation for long-term improvements in sentencing and corrections policy; that
reforms might be overly focused on nonviolent drug offenders, neglecting other categories of offenders
who constituted a larger share of the prison population; and that giving greater discretion to sentencing
judges and corrections officials—a central objective of reformers—might not lead to much softening of
punishment in practice. To varying degrees, each of these concerns has been borne out by experience.
The post-2000 sentencing reform movement found its culmination in the Justice Reinvestment
Initiative (JRI). The concept of ‘‘justice reinvestment’’ was first developed in a 2003 paper by Susan
Tucker and Eric Cadora.4 They suggested that if imprisonment could be reduced, the resulting monetary
savings might be reinvested in social services and infrastructure development in high-crime, high-
incarceration neighborhoods; such reforms, they argued, might more effectively protect public safety
over the long run than the prevailing tough-minded, enforcement-based strategies. After reinvestment-
inspired reforms had success in a handful of states, the concept was refined into the JRI. Promoted and
partly financed by the federal government, and supported by a small group of other agencies, the JRI
included a formalized process for reviewing and improving state sentencing and corrections policies.5
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 29 , NO . 1 • OCTOBER 2016 1
Federal Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1–5, ISSN 1053-9867, electronic ISSN 1533-8363.
© 2016 Vera Institute of Justice. All rights reserved. Please direct requests for permission to photocopy
or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page,
http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p¼reprints. DOI: 10.1525/fsr.2016.29.1.1.
More than half of the states have at least attempted the JRI process, with most ultimately adopting
significant reform legislation. Putting the extraordinary California experience to one side, a good case
could be made that the JRI has been the state sentencing reform story of the past decade.
The present issue of FSR thus focuses on the JRI in more detail. Articles recount the JRI experience
in two specific states, offer more general reflections on the present and future of the JRI as a national
phenomenon, and compare the JRI experiences of the United States and the United Kingdom. In these
Editor’s Observations, I provide an overview of these contributions, but first offer a few thoughts of my
own, assessing in a very preliminary way how well JRI has responded to the challenges I identified in
2002 for the then-emerging ‘‘new politics of sentencing.’’6
I. JRI as the New Politics of Sentencing
In the early 2000s, as burgeoning corrections budgets were attracting increasing levels of critical
attention and inspiring bipartisan reform efforts, one key question was whether fiscal motivations
would truly support the right kind of sentencing and corrections changes—reforms that would bring
down imprisonment and keep it down in sustainable ways. Government fiscal planning is notoriously
biased to the short term; the logic of political accountability through frequent elections practically
guarantees a quick-fix mentality on the part of governors and legislators. For that reason, there seemed
a real risk that efforts to reduce corrections budgets would head in a counterproductive direction. For
instance, programming for offenders might be cut, community supervision positions left unfilled, or
necessary construction to ease prison overcrowding deferred. Such policy choices might save money in
the short run, but could have an adverse effect on recidivism rates and so eventually lead to greater
demand for correctional resources in the long run. Likewise, simply releasing prisoners more quickly
without investing additional resources in reentry planning and community supervision might yield
short-term dividends, but would be unlikely to achieve sustainable reductions in the prison
population.
To its credit, the officially sanctioned JRI process is designed to produce durable, systematic reform,
not just quick fixes.7 Although fiscal pressures may initially bring policymakers to the table, once they get
there, they will find a process that includes extensive data collection, analysis of leading criminal justice
cost drivers, and development of multiple policy options. The process is also designed to build on itself
over time through reinvestment of the savings achieved by virtue of reduced incarceration. The money
should not all go to plugging short-term holes in the state budget, but should instead support the
development and expansion of evidence-based programs to reduce recidivism. In theory, at least, the
‘‘reinvestment’’ component of the JRI responds effectively to concerns that budget-minded sentencing
and corrections reforms will prove penny-wise, but pound-foolish.
The reality of the JRI, however, does not always live up to the theory. The reinvestment piece has been
particularly problematic. Some JRI states have adopted no reinvestment plan at all, while others com-
mitted only a small percentage of savings to recidivism-reduction initiatives. Moreover, what reinvest-
ment commitments were made at the outset often proved less than firm and reliable, as some states later
chose to redirect savings to general budgetary purposes. Indeed, more generally, the JRI has suffered
from a lack of sustained commitment by policymakers; recommended reforms have sometimes been
disregarded, or adopted and then later either repealed or undercut through new waves of ad hoc, tough-
on-crime legislation adopted after the passing of the fiscal crisis.
A second key question for the new politics of sentencing was whether reforms would reach much
beyond the nonviolent drug offenders. Over the long course of American history, public attitudes toward
drugs have regularly swung back and forth from permissive to intolerant.8 The post-2000 sentencing
reform push coincided with a shift away from that period of extreme intolerance commonly termed the
War on Drugs. Harsh drug sentencing laws thus became an easy target for reformers looking to reduce
incarceration. Indeed, much reform was structured around distinctions between ‘‘violent’’ and ‘‘non-
violent’’ offenders, with breaks given to the nonviolent offenders to ensure adequate prison space for the
violent. In particular, nonviolent drug offenders benefitted from a rapid proliferation of drug courts and
other programs aiming to divert drug-involved criminals from incarceration into treatment.
Whatever the merit of these initiatives, however, they can have only a modest direct impact on
national imprisonment rates. Putting the federal system to one side, drug offenders—even at the height
of the War on Drugs—have always been a much smaller portion of the national prison population than
those serving time for violent crimes. (In 2000, they constituted about 21 percent of state prisoners,
whereas violent offenders constituted about 49 percent.9) Moreover, many of those nominally in prison
on drug convictions are serving sentences that are still driven in some significant way by violence
concerns (e.g., a prior conviction for an assaultive crime or possession of a gun during the current drug
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offense). Reforms targeting the wholly nonviolent drug offender will reach only a quite limited number
of those being sent away for long prison terms.
More meaningful decarceration will require taking chances on some offenders who may seem, at first
blush, riskier. However, upon closer inspection, many of those who arguably fall on the wrong side of the
violent/nonviolent divide are not so dangerous after all, taking into account the age and specific cir-
cumstances of their offenses, their post-offense behavior, and the availability of effective treatment and
supervision in the community.
Although there is nothing in the JRI process that explicitly limits reform to nonviolent offenders,
there has been a marked tendency in practice for JRI states to focus on relatively easy, noncontroversial
diversions, especially for drug and property offenses and purely technical violations of probation or
parole. Perhaps no reform has been so widely embraced in the JRI states as has been the development of
new systems of graduated, community-based sanctions for technical violations, which serve as an
alternative to full-blown revocation and imprisonment. Also common has been reduced sentencing
ranges for low-dollar property offenses, marijuana offenses, and drug offenses in school zones. From
a mass incarceration standpoint, the JRI has been going after the low-hanging fruit. There is, of course,
some value to this, but continued progress will require bolder reform.
A third key question in 2002 was whether reform would rely chiefly on increasing the sentencing
discretion of judges and the release discretion of corrections officials, or would more directly mandate
changes in practice. The tough-on-crime legislation of the late twentieth century often curtailed official
discretion, as through mandatory minimum prison terms or ‘‘truth in sentencing,’’ so it made some
sense to think that increasing discretion in the early twenty-first century would help to bring down
excessive incarceration. However, this strategy would only work to the extent that front-line officials
actually agreed the prevailing, incarceration-heavy practices should change. On the other hand, if they
were generally pleased with the status quo, then simply giving them more power would accomplish little.
The first reform wave did emphasize the restoration of discretion, with one very prominent excep-
tion: Proposition 36, adopted by California voters in 2000, which mandated probation and treatment in
lieu of incarceration for certain categories of nonviolent drug offenders. Proposition 36 was an alter-
native to the drug court model, which relied heavily on official discretion to decide whom to divert into
treatment, and which bestowed upon judges considerable power to use incarceration as a penalty for
failures in treatment. Whereas the drug court model left front-line officials with plenty of room to
maintain a basically punitive approach to drug crime, Proposition 36 mandated a sharper break from
past practice.
For its part, the JRI process does not explicitly favor discretion over mandatory change, but the JRI’s
emphasis on obtaining broad support across different government agencies may implicitly favor dis-
cretion; agencies are unlikely to support reforms that significantly reduce their power. (The push for
broad-based consensus also helps to explain why the JRI has focused so much on the low-hanging
decarceration fruit.) Certainly, in practice, much of the focus of JRI has been on developing new options
for sentencing judges and corrections officials, without necessarily mandating the use of those options.
At the same time, some reforms have imposed meaningful new limitations on the severity of punish-
ments, such as caps on the length of incarceration that can be imposed for technical violations of
probation or parole, and reductions in the maximum penalties for some low-level drug and property
crimes. More aggressive use of firm constraints like these may be necessary to achieve more impressive
reductions in incarceration.
II. JRI: Recent Developments and Future Prospects
In this issue of FSR, our contributors touch on these points and many other notable aspects of the JRI.
Two articles cover the JRI experience in specific states. Mark Bergstrom and Kristofer Bret Bucklen tell
the Pennsylvania story.10 The Keystone State adopted legislation emerging from the JRI process in 2012,
with the centerpiece being new measures to reduce the level of imprisonment from technical violations
of parole. Bergstrom and Bucklen report that Pennsylvania is on track to meet its population-reduction
goals, but that reinvestment has been slower and smaller than anticipated. Nonetheless, state leaders
have been sufficiently pleased with their experience that they recently initiated a new round of JRI
analysis and discussion to focus on front-end criminal justice reforms, including sentencing.
In her article, Rebecca Murdock focuses on North Carolina, which adopted JRI reforms in 2011.11 In
particular, she describes changes to habitual offender laws, a new sentencing option that permits
accelerated release based on the completion of programming in prison, and a new requirement for post-
release supervision. She notes surprisingly low utilization of new sentencing options (both a new
habitual offender option and the new accelerated-release opportunity). Among other things, her article
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highlights the importance of plea-bargaining dynamics in determining the extent to which new sen-
tencing options will be used in practice.
In their article, James Austin, Todd Clear, and Garry Coventry offer a more general assessment of the
American JRI experience.12 They unpack in more detail the original Tucker-Cadora concept of justice
reinvestment and show how the JRI in practice has deviated from that ideal. They find no evidence that
the JRI states, as a whole, have done a significantly better job at reducing their prison populations than
the non-JRI states, and they observe that the JRI has so far produced very little ‘‘reinvestment,’’ as Tucker
and Cadora understood the term. They call for a refocused, reinvigorated JRI—one that emphasizes
‘‘justice’’ rather than public safety, and that aims for much larger reductions in imprisonment.
Faye Taxman also considers the national experience more broadly.13 Among other sources of dis-
appointment with the JRI, she notes that the initiative could and should do much more to build
treatment capacity for mental illness and substance abuse disorders, which could lead to a significant
reduction in recidivism rates. Taxman also calls for a new focus on programs and agencies outside the
justice system, which could help people to avoid becoming involved in the system in the first place.
In their article, Judith A. Greene and Vincent Schiraldi intriguingly ask whether the JRI strategy,
‘‘with its top-down reliance on technocratic data analysis and elite consensus-building, should be pre-
ferred to a vigorous bottom-up approach that flexes grassroots muscle and elicits broad public engage-
ment, as well as litigation, to build powerful political demands for systemic change.’’14 They note that the
nation’s three decarceration champs, California, New York, and New Jersey, have made their gains
without going through the JRI process. Greene and Schiraldi then take a closer look at New York City,
which has been the main driver of New York State’s overall imprisonment decline. The City has achieved
sharp declines in both incarceration and crime, powerfully demonstrating that cutting the former does
not necessarily lead to more of the latter.
Kevin Wong and Kris Christmann provide an international perspective.15 They describe justice
reinvestment efforts in the United Kingdom, drawing contrasts with the American JRI experience using
an original framework for assessing the scale, capacity, and outcomes of justice reinvestment programs.
They lament the piecemeal development of justice reinvestment in the United Kingdom through a dis-
parate set of pilot programs. Federal financial and technical support for the JRI, combined with the
relative autonomy of American state governments, have permitted more rapid development on this side
of the Atlantic. Still, Americans might find something to learn from the U.K. programs, some of which
have arguably remained truer to the original social-justice spirit of justice reinvestment than has the
American JRI.
Finally, Darren Wheelock and I report results from our survey research on voter attitudes toward the
criminal justice system in Wisconsin.16 Although our article does not directly concern the JRI, it does
highlight some of the political dynamics that have made bolder JRI reforms so challenging. For instance,
we find significant differences in the attitudes of Republican and Democratic voters. Despite the support
of high-profile Republicans like Newt Gingrich and Grover Norquist for decarceration, we find that
Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to give a high priority to cutting costs in the criminal
justice system. Indeed, Republicans tend to place much greater importance on giving criminals ‘‘the
punishment they deserve’’ than to cost-cutting. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats to
criticize how well the system is currently ensuring deserved punishment. Such results suggest that rank-
and-file Republicans may not have climbed aboard the reform bandwagon to the same extent as party
elites. These fault lines, of course, seem to echo the intraparty divisions displayed so vividly in con-
nection with the presidential campaign of Donald Trump.
III. Conclusion
Concerns about the fiscal burdens of mass incarceration are not unique to the new millennium, but two
successive recessions followed by uneven, shallow recoveries devastated state budgets and gave new
political traction to calls for cost-cutting sentencing reforms. The JRI established a systematic process for
translating the new political dynamics into durable improvements to state justice systems, rather than
just short-sighted quick fixes. JRI reforms seem generally well-designed to help states use their cor-
rectional resources more efficiently, with fewer resources—including fewer prison beds—devoted to
low-risk offenders. The movement has proven much less effective at reducing the overall scale of
imprisonment, not to mention rebuilding the human resources and physical infrastructure of high-
crime, high-incarceration neighborhoods, as the originators of justice reinvestment hoped.
Achieving large-scale reductions in imprisonment likely requires a commitment to that as an end in
itself, in contrast to the ends of cost cutting, recidivism reduction, and efficiency that have been exalted
by the JRI. A social commitment to deep decarceration, in turn, may require a new ‘‘new politics of
4 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 29 , NO . 1 • OCTOBER 2016
sentencing’’—one that is less technocratic and more grounded in compassion; less oriented to achieving
consensus among justice system agencies and insiders, including those who have an interest in
maintaining the mass incarceration status quo, and more oriented to serving the needs of those on
whom the system acts, their families, and their neighborhoods. The limitations of the old ‘‘new politics’’
become clearer year by year, but the path to genuinely new approaches remains uncertain.
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